) ("Ilt is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined."); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949 ) ("The court has no power to interfere with the conduct of the prison or its discipline...."); Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F. Supp. 706, 707 (M.D. Pa. 1949 ) ("nor is it within the province of the courts to superintend the treatment of prisoners in penitentiaries, or interfere with the conduct of prisons or their discipline.").
6. See, e.g., United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1965 ) ("The federal prison system is operated in all its aspects by... the executive branch of the government, and not by the judiciary .... ); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F. 2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955 ) ("The control of federal penitentiaries is entrusted to the Attorney General.. . who, no doubt, exercises] a wise and humane discretion in safeguarding the rights and privileges of prisoners.... ."); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1952); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Lewis v. Gladden, 230 F. Supp. 786, 788 (D.Ore. 1964 ) ("iT]he administration of penal institutions is for the executive, rather than the judicial, branch of our Government.") (The case attributed the doctrine to such underlying judicial considerations as the lack of judicial expertise in penology 7 or in the administration of prisons, the fear that judicial intervention will subvert prison disciplineI and the apprehension that judicial efforts to review prison officials' treatment of prisoners might open a 'Tandora's Box" leading to judicial supervision of every aspect of prison life.
9
The hands-off doctrine has been greatly weakened in recent years, 0 and its underpinnings have been found wanting. The separation of powers argument is inconsistent with administrative law doctrine. In similar situations involving the constitutionality of the actions of administrative agencies, courts have rarely precluded judicial review, even in cases where enabling statutes labeled the action by the administrator "final." n Indeed in recent years judicial review has been expanded to many new areas of administrative decision-making. 1 2 In the area of first amendment security are matters of state concern and federal courts will not inquire into them unless in exceptional circumstances. " See, e.g., Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783 
, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
9 See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1969 ) (Tamm, J., concurring in the result).
10 See infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text. See also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (allegation in state prisoner's suit brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that he was denied permission to purchase certain religious publications, and denied privileges accorded other prisoners, solely because of his religious beliefs, held to state a cause of action).
" See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 119-20 (1946); Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1967 595 (1965) .
2E.g., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare rights). In Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294 Supp. , 1301 Supp. -02 (S.D.N.Y. 1971 , the court spoke to the question of judicial review of the decisions of a parole board restricting the first amendment rights of parolees:
But it is urged that the [Parole] Board's action is outside the court's power of review. It would be surprising, and gravely questionable, if Congress had meant to confer such final authority upon any administrative agency, particularly one that makes no pretense to learning in constitutional law. It would be bizarre to hold.., that assertions of rights in particular, the judicial mandate to review administrative action is nearly absolute:
Broadly speaking, agency action attacked on constitutional grounds Could be immune from judicial review, if ever, only by the plainest manifestation of congressional intent to that effect." ... But the case against such immunity is clear in the domain of the First Amendment.
5
In Brown v. Peyton, 14 a case in which Black Muslim inmates claimed violations by prison officials of their first amendment rights to freedom of religion, the Fourth Circuit recognized the necessity for courts to review the decisions of prison administrators to insure that the constitutional rights of inmates are protected:
[P]rison officials are not judges. They are not charged by law and constitutional mandate with the responsibility for interpreting and applying constitutional provisions.... We do not denigrate their views but we cannot be absolutely bound by them. 15 Similarly, considerations of federalism cannot properly be asserted when violations of constitutional rights are claimed by state prisoners. 6 As the Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. Avery, 17 a case involving the constitutional right of access to court of Tennessee prisoners: "There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detenconstitutional rights like those made here may be overridden without ever being faced and decided by any tribunal of any kind. The court went on to say that "the fundamental issues of constitutional law are considered... as... essentially identical [for parolees and prisoners]." Id. at 1304 n.8.
13Id. at 1302. The court quoted from Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1964) . Courts often label first amendment freedoms "preferred rights. " See, e.g., Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Neb.) , af 'd sub nom. Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1962 285, 287 (2d Cir. ), a9'd, 374 U.S. 150 (1963 : "But a mere grant of authority [over prisoners, granted to the Bureau of Prisons] cannot be taken as a blanket waiver of responsibility in its execution. Numerous federal agencies are vested with extensive administrative responsibilities. But it does not follow that their actions are immune from judicial review."
16 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 771-72 (N.D. Cal. 1971) . See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 109 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1970 tion facilities are state functions. They are subject to federal authority only when paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights intervene." Legitimate constitutional complaints of inmates are always paramount to state claims of federalism.
The underlying reasons given for the hands-off doctrine-that courts lack expertise in the administration of prisons or in penology, that court intervention in the prisoners' rights area will subvert prison discipline, or that judicial review of prisoners' complaints will open a "Pandora's Box" of litigation--seem equally unpersuasive. Although it is true that judges usually lack experience in running prisons, they also lack experience in running welfare offices, schools, or draft boards, but they have intervened in these areas in the past when constitutional rights were at stake. 8 Courts traditionally meet such problems by use of expert witnesses.
The argument for judicial intervention in the correctional area, assuming questions of constitutional magnitude have been raised, is, in fact, much more persuasive than in the cases of the suggested analogies, in that the judiciary is intimately involved in the correctional process. The courts are responsible for the presence of every man assigned to sentenced institutions. 9 Furthermore, judges not only decide through bail setting and parole procedures which pre-trial defendants are incarcerated and which are released, but in many jurisdictions they also retain control over the defendants throughout the period of pretrial incarceration. 20 Judges have also traditionally made sentencing decisions on the basis of presentencing reports which are replete with psychological and sociological factors about defendants, factors presumed relevant to penological prescription. As a result, the sentencing procedure itself may be viewed as a fundamental part of the treatment, as well as the punishment of an offender. To deny the judiciary review of the treatment of an offender after making such a primary "rehabilita-18 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971 ) (schools); Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967 ) (draft boards).
1'This kind of follow-up responsibility has been acknowledged in a few instances by courts. Complaints of Convicts at 516 n.55. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961) .
20 See, e.g tive" decision is inconsistent. To further make judicial review of prison administrative decisions an exception to the general presumption of reviewability of administrative action is highly illogical.
The argument that judicial intervention, through abrogation of the hands-off doctrine, would undermine prison discipline is unrealistic.
2 1
The argument fails to take into account that prison officials need not fear court intervention unless the complained of administrative acts or regulations infringe the constitutionally protected rights of inmate complainants. Even if the inmate's litigation is successful, the time lag between punishment for the prohibited act and eventual judicial vindication is too great to encourage the inmate to disobey the jailer's directives. Furthermore, in analogous circumstances courts have required that complainants first comply with official directives, though they consider them to be improper, and then sue on their rights.n Finally, the inmate knows that he will suffer short-term punishment for the prohibited act, even though he eventually wins his court suit. While judicial abstention on prisoners' rights issues is one method of avoiding the problem of a plethora of litigation requiring judicial review of numerous narrow issues concerning the day-today activities of inmates, it is not a constitutionally acceptable means of doing S0. 23 Rather, the constitutional mandates of the first amendment are better served by carefully laid out standards which protect the inmates' rights while at the same time promoting the appropriate state interests, including the minimization of frivolous litigation. Recent cases rejecting simple but unjust resolutions of inmate complaints have set out such standards.
EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD USED TO WEIGH PRISONERS' FRIST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Access to courts was the first area in which courts broke with the hands-off doctrine.u This [Vol. 63
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
series of cases at once created precedent for prisoners' rights while ensuring inmates access to the courts for assertion of these rights. 25 The first case to suggest important limitations on the hands-off doctrine was Coffin v. Reichard. 26 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit established the basic standard by which many future prisoners' rights cases would be decided:
A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."
However, though this standard dearly recognized that prisoners possessed constitutional rights, it left available a broad basis for the denial of many rights. Imprisonment expressly takes away freedom of movement. Courts have ruled that, at the same time, it impliedly takes away other rights considered necessary for or consistent with, the purposes or "underlying considerations" of imprisonment."
The Coffin standard has been modified and clarified in succeeding years. In its newer form, the standard has often been applied to review restrictions on first amendment rights. 546, 549 (1941); United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162, 166-70 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Burns v. Swensen, 430 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1970); Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 551 (1st Cir. 1970); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 7 (3d Cir. 1970); McDonough v. Director, 429 F.2d 1189 , 1192 (4th Cir. 1970 Conway v. Oliver, 429 F.2d 1307 , 1308 (9th Cir. 1970 L. Rxv. 407, 410-12 (1967) . See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968 In Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,"2 a recent First Circuit case which concerned the right of inmates to send letters to the press, the court divided the "justifiable purpose[s] of imprisonment" into purposes of the criminal law and purposes of prison administration. In the former category the court listed the generally recognized goals underlying our penal system: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and security of the public (restraint). The purposes of prison administration include those aspects of imprisonment made necessary by the existence of the penal system itself: the security of prisoners and guards (sometimes more broadly stated as maintenance of internal institutional order) and the minimization of the expenses of prison administration. Courts have accepted the need for various limitations on the first amendment rights of prisoners on the basis of claims of prison officials that one or more of these purposes would be served.
3
Recently, several courts have given much greater force to the Carothers standard by requiring prison officials to define and relate specific purposes of imprisonment to specific restrictions on inmates' rights.U Previously, a mere general allegation by prison officials that a restriction was related to the purposes of imprisonment had been sufficient to justify the restriction.
Other courts have set out a "balancing of interests" test which is broader than the "justifiable purposes" test of Carothers:
1 Id. at 1024 (footnote and citations omitted). s'451 F.2d 545, 548-50 (1st Cir. 1971 415, 438 (1963) .
3a See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 -01 (D.C. Cir. 1969 Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786, 788 (D.R.I. 1970) .
" See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) : "[Elven though the government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Note that this requirement would reach judicially or legislatively mandated withdrawal of constitutional rights of inmates, as well as administrative actions resulting in such withdrawal or limitation ment, including restraint, must be achieved through means which least restrict the first amendment rights of those incarcerated.
Taken together, the "balancing of interests" and "least restrictive means" tests suggest the fairest future approach for reviewing the first amendment rights of prisoners. The former test permits first amendment rights of inmates to be restricted only when a compelling state interest is served in a meaningful way by the restriction and the corresponding burden on first amendment rights is not too great. The least restrictive means test complements the balancing test. It requires that in cases in which some infringement of inmates' first amendment rights is necessary to achieve important penological goals, the level of infringement be as small as possible. And when these goals, though compelling and though served by the infringement, can also be achieved without infringing these rights, the goals must be so achieved.
40
The two tests are the same or similar to tests used by many courts in the past to review infringements on the first amendment rights of free citizens. 4 175 (1968) . The same least constitutionally restrictive alternatives test would seem to require that punishment necessary to maintain internal discipline should also avoid constitutional deprivations so far as possible.
40 Some courts have used the "least restrictive means" and "balancing of interests" tests interchangeably, letting either one function for both. However, though the two are closely related, each does serve a distinct purpose. Thus, the state interest behind a particular action or regulation might support some restriction on inmates' first amendment rights but the action or regulation might still be unconstitutional because it was not the least restrictive means of achieving that state interest. Conversely, although certain actions may be the least constitutionally restrictive means of achieving a particular state interest, the interest itself might not be compelling enough to justify any restriction on inmates' first amendment rights. Unfortunately, a majority of cases supporting religious freedom in prisons are based on equal protection of the law, rather than on a finding of first amendment right to religious practice in prison.
2 The implication of these rulings is that even if prison administrators may not discriminate against the practice of a particular religion, there is no guarantee that they may not limit the practice of all religions, so long as they do so equally. Nor do these cases hold even the right to equal treatment of religions to be absolute. Under these rulings, if prison officials can make an affirmative showing that the religious sect in question abuses the right to gather and worship, reasonable limitations may be imposed.
9 Furthermore, the opinions have stated that considerations of security or administrative expense may justify otherwise discriminatory limitations on the religious activity of a particular sect, even absent any such abuse. 60 5 6 This distinction has been drawn in both nonprisoners' and prisoners' rights cases. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) Cir. 1971 ) (inmates, as distinguished from clergy, might be prevented from conducting their own religious services, so long as inmates of other religious sects were also prevented from doing so). Protected religious services constitute the only court-approved right to inmate assembly to date. The right of inmates to wear religious medals has received uneven treatment. Generally, they can be outlawed entirely as dangerous, but prison officials cannot discriminate among medals of various religions. See Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, (5th Cir. 1969); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) . Though no court has expressly so stated, the wearing of religious medals is not considered a central requirement to most religions, and therefore, the denial of such activity constitutes only a mild restriction on first amendment rights. Bibles, however, must be allowed in the institutions; this is true even of the controversial Koran. Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Northernv. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970 ), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971 ). However, it might be considered permissible for officials to restrict circulation of the Koran to Muslims if it is felt that more general circulation might create a "clear and present danger." See notes 127-45 infra and accompanying text. While bibles may actually be more dangerous than religious medals as weapons of destruction, (bibles are more useful than are medals for stuffing plumbing facilities or setting fires, the two most common problems faced by prison maintenance staff) these holy books must be made available to inmates, presumably because they are much more important to religious exercise than are medals. 61411 F.2d 23, 28 (5th Cir. 1969) . 62390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
Muhammad Speaks and that prisoners of other religious sects were permitted to receive similar publications, under Long, inmates still would not have the right to receive the publication if it created "a clear and present danger of a breach of prison security or discipline or some other substantial interference with the orderly functioning of the institutions." 64 In Walker the court granted certain requested rights to Muslims but refused them the right to special after-sunset meals during the month of December (Ramadan) and the right to listen to daily radio broadcasts of Elijah Muhammad, though other non-religious radio programs were already broadcast to inmates during the same hour. The court found that equal protection of religions did not require that Muslims be allowed either activity as "'there [was] no purposeful discrimination as among the various religious sects in prison as to diet,'" 65 and no similar religious radio programming was being directed at other religions. 5 The court further justified the two restrictions based upon very general allegations of prison officials that both activities would cause security problems and increase the cost of running the prisons.
The Walker and Long courts seem wrong in their requirement that equal protection be the sole basis for religious freedom in prison. The Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Peyton' 7 specifically stated that religious freedom for prisoners need not be based on equal protection considerations. Outside of prison, the first amendment has been held to pro-14 Id. (footnote omitted). Is 411 F.2d at 26. 66 The treatment by the court of the question of the importance of the denied rights to the practice of Islam is most interesting. Special meals at Ramadan were dismissed as "those minor restrictions on the practice of the faith of Islam." 411 F.2d at 26. No expert testimony is stated on the importance of this practice to the religion. Presumably the JudaeoChristian court made a reasoned decision on the subject. As to the radio program, the court held that "petitioners have failed to show that the broadcast was essential to the spiritual well-being of the petitioners, rather than merely a source of '... spiritual rest and consolation and inspiration...' to them." 411 F.2d at 28. The distinction seems a fuzzy one. Compare Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 , 1006 (8th Cir. 1971 79 See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th tained the refusal of authorities to provide inmates with pork-free meals during Ramadan partially because of the extra expense involved. However, future courts, using a balancing of interests test, should find that few limitations on free exercise are constitutionally justified by financial considerations: The state interest in such budget restrictions should rarely rate the label of "compelling."
Even if the state interest in minimization of prison expenses is a justification for some limitation on free exercise, no court has yet addressed the legal consequences of the fact that in many of our jails and prisons the Muslim religion is a very popular, if not the most popular, religion among inmates. For example, it has been held that a state need not provide a paid full-time chaplain for every denomination 0 The courts have held that such expense would be inconsistent with the interest of the state. But if Islam is the chief religion, it would seem that the one full-time paid chaplain must be of that religion. The popularity of the religion may also require greater state expenditures to accommodate' the needs of the imprisoned congregation than were required when the religion was a minority one.
'
The balancing of interests and least restrictive means tests portend further expansion of inmate religious rights. Though religious freedom has already been given more judicial support than other first amendment freedoms for inmates, further gains can be expected as courts scrutinize more carefully official claims of security requirements and budget restrictions. The chief beneficiaries of such gains would be Black Muslims, a growing segment of our prison society, who have been subjected to many restrictions in the past.
.Establishment Clause
Courts have not yet directly faced the issue of the constitutional rights of inmate atheists and agnostics. The Establishment Clause of the first amendment would seem to require that these inmates be Cir. 1971); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 26 (5th Cir. 1969) .
80 Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4-5 (3d Cir. 1970) . 81 Thus, while it has been held that at least some food at all meals must be pork free, administrators have not yet been ordered to provide a completely pork-free diet. If the effect on the exercise of religion by the majority of the inmates is weighed against the small extra cost, if any, of providing entirely pork-free meals, the provision of such a diet would seem to be required. [Vol. 63 granted rights to freedom of movement, assembly, and visits for non-religious purposes equal to those granted to other inmates for religious purposes. To deny such rights to atheists and agnostics is for the state to greatly encourage religious activity, because it is well known that prisoners are willing to go to great lengths to have visitors or attend meetings in order to alleviate the prison monotony. Although the denial of these rights to atheists and agnostics would encourage religious activity in general rather than participation in a particular religion,2 such an approach runs afoul of the Establishment Clause because the state thus grants important freedoms to inmates who practice a religion while denying them to those who do not. The unfairness of this approach is magnified by the fact that parole boards consider an inmate's religious activity in determining fitness for release. This procedure not only encourages atheists and agnostics to practice the religions favored by parole board members, but also may force inmates who practice religions less represented on the board to switch religions while in prison, thus violating both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the first amendment.P
RIGHT TO INCOMING AND OUTGOING MAIL
Courts have read the Free Speech Clause of the first amendment to include the right to correspond with others. 4 The earliest cases protecting the mailing rights of inmates covered letters and papers sent to and from courts. 8 " Presently, many 82 In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) , the Supreme Court stated that: "Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance... is voluntary can free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause...." And in Abinton School Dist. v. Shemp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) ,the Court stated that "to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." '4 The Supreme Court made clear its general disapproval of such a result in Engel v. Vitale, where it said: "When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." 370 U.S. at 431.
In a recent development, the court in Theriault v. Carlson, 334 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972) , prohibited clergymen from submitting reports to the parole board about inmates' religious activities, because such practices involved the government in violation of the neutrality it must observe with respect to religion. Such practices compel inmates to participate in religious activity by punishing the non-believer. Other early cases involving the right of inmates to send and receive mail have been based on equal protection of religion and race.
s Although these cases speak about first as well as fourteenth amendment rights, they are based primarily on earlier court decisions in the equal protection area. This line of cases, as well as a line of sixth amendment cases, provided an important bridge to recent cases which established a prisoner's right to correspondence based solely on the Free Speech Clause.
Closely related to inmate communication with courts, is inmate communication with attorneys, again involving both sixth and first amendment rights. Although the right to counsel and the special attorney-client privilege should play important roles in this area, 9 courts for a long time have found a more limited freedom of communication for inmate-attorney correspondence than for court mail.
0 In many jurisdictions this remains the rule today. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1966) .
Throughout the discussion herein, censorship refers to the reading of inmate mail, whether or not material is withheld or deleted. This practice differs from a total ban on all mail on the one hand, and mere inspection not including reading, on the other. See notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 28-29 (5th Cir. 1969) .
13 See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 535 (5th Cir. 1968 865 (1967) . The court, while agreeing with the trial judge that the actions of the prison authorities in opening the prisoner's mail to his attorney and communicating the contents to the state attor-tions is that an attorney may sometimes be used by third persons as a conduit for the transmission of dangerous messages such as escape plans or for the smuggling of contraband into the prison.
Some courts have been even more restrictive, allowing deletion of all material not related to the legality of an inmate's detention or treatment.
9 2 This is a particularly dangerous rule because the censoring officer deciding on the legal relevance of the letter is almost never an attorney, and the extent to which seemingly general information can be useful to an attorney in bringing meaningful litigation may not be obvious to the layman. Moreover, censoring officers are particularly sensitive to information critical of the conduct of the prison administration, information which can be especially important to prisoners' attorneys. Recently, several courts employing the balancing of interests test have found that if the asserted interest of the state in censoring inmate-attorney correspondence is weighed against the associated infringement of first, fifth and sixth amendment rights of the inmate, such censorship must be ended. 4 The likelihood of abuse of mailing privileges by attorneys would be small. 95 In the words of Judge Learned Hand, "the gravity of the evil [must be] discounted by its improbability." 16 The ney general were highly improper, held that such censorship was allowed by established law. See also Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965). The court there upheld prison censorship of attorney-client prisonermail on a modification of the hands off doctrine and a determination that the correspondence was not confidential. 9 1See Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 437, 227 N.E.2d 383, 384-85, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (1967) . Cf. Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965) .
. Official abuse of the censorship right can take many forms. In Rbinehart v. Rhay, 314 F. Supp. 81, 82-83 (W.D. Wash. 1970 ), letters to an inmate's attorney were withheld because they referred to "boundless" acts of "oral sodomy" among inmates and thus violated prison regulations against letters containing vulgar or obscene matter or complaining about prison policies. The court supported the activities of the prison authorities in the case:
The intercepted letters were withheld not for the purpose of interfering with the attorney-client relationship, but because of extraneous comments contained therein that the defendants believed to be otherwise [Vol. 63 that much of the legal discussion between inmate and prisoner will be in contemplation of possible suit against the very administration responsible for censoring the mail. expansion of opportunities for inmates to communicate with the outside world. Furthermore, no court has struck down the regulations common to most prisons which limit the number of correspondents to whom a prisoner may write or from whom he may receive mail.1 Not only are the number of correspondents limited, but also prison officials must approve individual correspondents.
1 0 Courts have approved the first restriction as necessary to keep down the cost of censoring inmate mail. The latter restriction is thought to provide prison officials with a mechanism for preventing inmates from corresponding with those on the outside who might deter rehabilitation, as well as aid escape or send contraband.
A number of considerations militate in favor of striking down general mailing restrictions on the ground that they actually interfere with postrelease success. An inmate must contact many people in anticipation of his release. The most obvious of these are possible employers, persons running school programs, rehabilitative programs or drug programs, and former acquaintances who can be helpful in these areas. Administrative roadblocks will dissuade many inmates from pursuing these several paths to possible post-release adjustment. Most of these men md women have met with frustration in trying to set up a stable life on the outside before. If an important purpose of imprisonment is to lead offenders away from future criminal activity, impediments to communication with persons on the outside who could help them to do so seems clearly counterproductive. Nor is the likelihood of successful reacclimation enhanced when the inmate is isolated from the outside world in which his problems arose and is instead forced to concentrate on the artificial world of prison. This isolation makes it impossible for the inmate to learn to react in more constructive ways to his former environment. 101 If, for example, a source of strain for him has been domestic problems, he cannot try to work them out before release if he is isolated from his family during that period. Relatively unhindered communication would allow the inmate to work out the problem with his family before he returned to the street. The return to his family would of course provide him with an important anchor upon release. The present system of state interest in rehabilitation should be weighed in the balancing test on the side of greater mailing rights for inmates.
More specifically, few courts have ordered an end to the regulations in force in many prisons prohibiting an inmate from writing to any exoffender.
10 9 This blanket rule has been justified on the theory that other ex-offenders will be a bad influence on the inmate. It is absurd, however, to deny to an inmate, on rehabilitative grounds, the opportunity to communicate with ex-offenders on the outside while at the same time forcing him to live with hundreds of recently convicted men in the closest of circumstances-circumstances in which the first offender is often housed with multiple offenders; the petty criminal with the professional criminal. The claimed state interest is simply not realistically served in such an instance." 0 This and similar irrationalities are not lost on the inmates. Such restrictions are also probably counterproductive from the point of view of rehabilitation in that they teach inmates the inconsistent nature of the law and consequently a disrespect for authority."' Closely related are limitations on inmate mailing rights based on administrative considerations, which also have a negative impact on rehabilitation. Many prisons, for example, do not allow an inmate to conduct a business while he is incarcerated,' 1 ' no matter how legitimate the business isolation followed by release may be one reason for the generally high recidivism rates found in many studies. [T]o the extent that prison regulations are designed to teach the prisoners to live in conformity with the norms of society, the sporadic and discretionary enforcement of unreasonable regulations, it appears to us, is more likely to breed contempt of the law than respect for, and obedience to it. Unrestricted, arbitrary and unlawful treatment of prisoners would eventually discourage prisoners from cooperating in their rehabilitation. '2 United States ex rd. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1954); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th may be. The justifications for this restriction range from refusal to allow inmates in pursuit of personal gain to cause expenditure of prison monies (such as the time of officers to censor the letters) to a fear that the conduct of a profitable business will provide the inmate with money to buy favors from guards and other inmates."' The former argument is weak at best: if the censorship itself is unnecessary there is no cost to the state. The latter justification for such restriction is invalid under the least restrictive means test. Disallowing all business correspondence is not the constitutionally least restrictive method of avoiding the feared abuse: it would be sufficient to simply limit the money that an inmate is allowed to bring into the prison; the inmate could deposit the remainder on the outside for post-release use. As the availability of money and a business position are so important to the post-release success of the ex-offender, there is actually a strong state interest in encouraging legitimate business interests among inmates.
Two other goals of the criminal law, retribution and deterrence, may be served by restricting inmate mailing rights. Again, however, because these goals can be equally well achieved by other means, the least restrictive means test requires that the goals not be achieved by such constitutionally burdensome restrictions."
4
Of the four underlying goals of the criminal law, only security (restraint) remains as a state interest which might possibly justify restrictions on inmate mailing rights."
5 Mail restriction and censorship practices have been justified as necessary to detect escape plans and to prevent the introduction of contraband into the prisons. The likelihood of detecting escape plans in inmate correspondence would appear to be slim, the more so since such plans could be communicated during visits which Contraband such as escape tools, weapons, and drugs entering the prison would represent a threat to security. However, the risk can be fully met by having incoming mall inspected but not read. To prevent abuses, inspections should be conducted in the sight of the inmate receiving the letter.
The availability of censorship provides prison personnel with the opportunity to read and censor perfectly legal correspondence which contain statements that can be construed as critical of the prison administration. The inmates' knowledge that censorship exists will have an important "chilling effect" on the thoughts they are willing to express in outgoing correspondenceiu 7 Thus, the practice tends to isolate inmates from constructive contacts with the outside world. Also, an important channel for the reduction of inmate tension is dosed. To a significant extent, therefore, harsh censorship practices probably serve to hinder rehabilitation of inmates and may actually increase security problems within prisons. At best, the state interest in censorship is unclear; the corresponding infringement on inmates' first amendment rights is severe. Nor did the court find that aspect of restraint involving protection of the public from threatening letters from inmates an appropriate basis for censorship: "Officials of the Adult Correctional Institution have also taken it upon themquestioned whether "the purposes of imprisonment" justified censorship of inmate correspondence and found "justification only for fewer restrictions because total censorship serves no rational deterrent, rehabilitative or prison security purposes," the court in Morales v. Schmidt' 9 went even further, stating that prison rules denying any "fundamental" rights require a most "compelling" state interest. The court stated that the need for internal discipline or the protection of guards, inmates, or administration would not by itself constitute such an interest: "if the functions of deterrence and rehabilitation cannot be performed in a prison without the imposition of a restrictive regime not reasonably related to those functions, it may well be that those functions can no longer be performed constitutionally in a prison setting." 2 0
The *best rule would be no censorship or any other limitation on outgoing mail. Incoming mail should be inspected for contraband only.
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' As the administrative cost of such inspection should be low, it should not necessitate further interference with the rights of inmates. society's newsletter was a security risk. Though the opinions of New York State prison officials were held to be important, the experience of the neighboring New York City prisons, which permitted inmates to receive the publication, was held to have even greater probative value on the question of whether the publication posed a "clear and present danger." 129 Despite the positive outcome of this case, continued used by courts of the "clear and present danger" test to determine the availability of publications to inmates seems ill-advised. First, there is no hard evidence that any publication constitutes a clear and present danger."' Faced with the question as to whether a problem inmate should be denied the right to Mvuhammad Speaks, a journal which prison officials considered "racist," the court in Rowland v. Sigler"' stated:
Incoming Publications
Viewed in its entirety, the sum of the evidence is that the plaintiff is and has been a belligerent and uncooperative inmate, but nothing ties his attitudes to his race or his racial views. Only by speculation can it be said that his receiving of Muhammad Speaks would promote the attitudes which the prison administration understandably decries.ln There is no doubt that inmates are subject to unusually great tensions,"1 3 especially racial tension. Yet, the possibility seems equally as great that such "political" publications will diffuse tension by creating greater inmate awareness of the societal basis for these tensions, as that such publications will trigger aggressive acts based on that tension 34 "2 319 F. Supp. at 905. See Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 ,1231 (4th Cir. 1971 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970) . Many of the publications [Vol. 63 When racial tensions are responsible for discipline problems in prison the surest solution would appear to be segregation of the races. Yet courts have held such segregation to be constitutionally impermissible despite the apparent state interest involved. 35 In the case of banned publications the connection between restrictions on constitutional rights and a corresponding improvement in internal discipline is much less clear than in the case of segregation. There is no reason for courts to give inmates' rights to freedom of speech any less protectiori than that presently given to their rights to equal protection -and freedom from discrimination. Indeed, this first amendment right deserves the greatest protection. In a democratic society the free expression and reception of all political points of view serves the highest state interest. As the court stated in Fortune Society, "[f]ree discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principal of Thus, the right of a prisoner not to be subjected to racial discrimination is so paramount that it will prevail over even a strong showing that racial segregation of inmates tends to lessen intramural strife and disciplinary problems. political ideas after release. It is, therefore, antirehabilitative to prevent the inmates from confronting these ideas in an environment in which they can be digested and thought through thoroughly.
Second, the "clear and present danger" test is too vague and too likely to lead to the abuse of important constitutional rights of inmates such as equal protection and freedom of speech33s In employing a vague test like "clear and present danger," courts have not taken into account those who will implement the test. Censorship officers are usually lower-rank correctional personnel, most often white.
39 They are almost always without extensive training in penology. 40 Too often they censor that which they would consider inappropriate reading 1 However, they have no recognized sensitivity to the needs of people of a different race and background. It is important to note the words of a black federal judge facing the issue of the appropriateness of permitting political literature into prison:
It is not a function of our prison system to make prisoners conform in their political thought and belief to ideas acceptable to their jailers .... [Rather, the] function is to try to rehabilitate the law-breaker by convincing him of the validity of our legal system.'4
The present system of censorship does not do this.
Even if there were such a thing as ideas which are a "clear and present danger," it is unrealistic to think that banning certain publications or even 118 See note 134 supra and note 141 infra. In the rare case of a publication which merely explained excape technique, prohibition would still be proper. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglas, ., dissenting).
rain Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 876 (1970) , miodified sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), Judge Motley pointed out that while seventy percent of the New York State prison population were non-whites, only two percent of the entire guard force was black or Puerto Rican, and these few were assigned to inferior positions.
140 In New York City, for example, guards receive four weeks of training in which to learn all aspects of correctional work. RuLES AND PRocEDuREs or TE DEPA TMENT Or CORRECTION OF THE Crry OF N sw Yoan § 3.126 (1966) . 141 See, e.g., list in note 134 supra. It is not an official state policy which keeps out these books, but rather the list is the result of decisionmaking in individual institutions. See also Jack Newfield, "Prison Censors," Village Voice, Feb. 10, 1972, censoring incoming mail will have more than a marginal effect on the spread of such ideas within the prison. For, as the court pointed out in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,43 "prisoners are quite well able to proselytize directly." Official attempts to keep out controversial literature probably does not improve security, but rather reinforces the position of those in the inmate society who already espouse those controversial views. It also serves to teach inmates disrespect for their jailers.
If the "clear and present danger" test is still to be employed by courts, in the future they should do so only in the context of the principles set out by Professor Freund in On Understanding the Supreme Court:'"
The truth is that the clear-and-present-danger test is an over simplified judgment unless it takes account also of a number of other factors: the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech or political activity; the availability of more moderate controls than those which the state has imposed; and perhaps the specific intent with which the speech or activity is launched. No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase 'clear and present danger,' or how closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the weighing of values. They tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most certain is the complexity of the strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must disentangle.' 4 5
Closely related to the above is the question of allowing inmates to receive or possess pornography. At the very least, censorship must be more specific than a general ban on "obscene" literature. That standard would provide correctional personnel with the opportunity to abuse the censorship regulations by violating the rights of prisoners to receive political and literary publications. At least one court, wishing to avoid such abuse, has limited censorship only to those publications failing to meet obscenity standards set out by the Supreme Defendant officials have given an untrained custodial officer unbridled discretion to screen out To date, the various standards, including the balancing of interests test as employed by most courts to determine the constitutionality of censorship practices, have been insufficient on at least two counts. Though courts now require officials to associate each restriction on inmate correspondence with a specific "underlying consideration" or "compelling" state interest, many courts have not gone so far as to consider whether the restriction will actually serve the associated penological goal in any meaningful way. Indeed in many instances the restrictions may actually have important negative impacts on achieving penological goals. Nor have courts considered the likelihood that the availability of the restriction will be abused by the prison staff. On this last point they have not realistically considered the level of personnel making many of the censorship decisions, nor indeed the lack of penological training of prison officials in general.
Related Rights of Outside Correspondents
At least two courts m have recognized that the first amendment rights of the outside correspondent, as well as those of the inmate, are infringed upon by prison censorship rules. This recognition has obvious importance---however appropriate limitations on the constitutional rights of inmates may be, the first amendment rights of free correspondents must be broad indeed. One court'4' has recognized that the broad rights of the press to circulate printed material includes the right to send such material into prisons.
RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR

REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
Several courts have granted prisoners an absoany material which in his subjective opinion he believes to be pornographic. This, of course, is not a legitimate method of preventing hard core pornography from entering the [prison] . [Vol. 63 lute right to send letters to public officials.'l These decisions have been based on the first amendment clause guaranteeing the right to petition for redress of grievances. A recent First Circuit decision, Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 5 extended this inmate right to include letters sent to the press and media. While the district court's decision in Nolan"' was based primarily on the right to petition for redress of grievances, the court of appeals based its decision on freedom of the press as well. However, the root justification for both decisions was really the same--the need of inmates to let the public know about conditions within our prisons. The district court held that:
[Inmates] have the right to appeal for redress of grievances not only to the courts and to the elected and appointed representatives of the people, but to the people themselves, and... such people are best reached by communications with the news media....
[Slome grievances of prisoners may be legitimate and yet may not be within the potential practical political achievements of a governor and of a legislature without an increased sensitivity and awareness in the part of the general public .... 15
The court of appeals expanded on this last theme:
[W]e rely primarily on the fact that the condition of our prisons is an important matter of public policy as to which prisoners are, with their wardens, peculiarly interested and peculiarly knowledgeable. The argument that the prisoner has the right to communicate his grievances to the press and, through the press, to the public is thus buttressed by the invisibility of prisons to the press and the public: the prisoners' right to speak is enhanced by the right of the public to hear. This does not depend upon a determination that wardens are unsympathetic to the need to improve prison condiditions. But even a warden who pushes aggressively for reforms or larger appropriations within his department and before appropriate officials and legislative committees may understandably not feel it prudent to push for more public laundering of institutional linen."'
The First Circuit also ruled in Nolan that the 149 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 788-89 (D.R.I. 1970) . This is the rule in federal prisons. See Turner, supra note 103, at 478 n.32. claimed state interest in minimizing the expense of administration did not justify the refusal of prison officials to approve the requests of inmates to send letters to the press: A flat ban on all letters to the press is obviously inexpensive to administer. It requires little of the censor's time to stamp "Rejected" on a letter, and prison officials need not spend time responding to issues which these letters raise. But on the present facts, the state interest in minimizing expenses does not rise to the level of an "important or substantial" interest. 5 1 The court also denied the claims of prison officials that state interests in deterrence, retribution, restraint or rehabilitation justified the restrictions on inmate attempts to correspond with the press. Indeed, both the district and appellate courts found that allowing inmates to post such letters served several positive penological goals. The writing of such letters might be rehabilitative to the men involved. At the same time it would diffuse inmate hostility if the men knew that the public could become aware of their grievances through means other than riots.' 5 On these points the district court quoted testimony of Professor Lloyd Ohlin of Harvard Law School who stated that although he could not be sure whether prisoner-press correspondence is a "good or a bad thing from the penological viewpoint," due to the total lack of research on the subject, he did feel that:
[Tihere is a good chance that letting prisoners correspond with newspapers and broadcasters would facilitate prison discipline by providing prisoners with a nonviolent and effective outlet for their grievances.
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Professor Ohlin further suggested that if the public were sensitive to prison conditions, prison reform might even be forthcoming as result of those letters.
As to the applicability of the twin state penal interests of retribution and deterrence to the ban on letters to the press, the First Circuit to achieving those effects. In holding that prisoners retain certain rights in prison, the courts have implicitly held that certain deprivations are not essential to the furtherance of these purposes: the argument which would justify all rules proves too much. Lacking evidence that the deprivation which a ban on letters to the press imposes is essential to deterrence or retribution, we told that it is not. A similar "all-rules" argument as to rehabilitation, that prisoners must learn to follow rules in order to become acceptable members of society, is similarly unpersuasive.
1 5 7
Thus, as in the case of inmate letters to public officials, no state interest in either the goals of the criminal law or in the purposes of prison administration were found to be compelling enough to justify the placing of restrictions on inmate letters to the press. See, e.g., United States v. Maas, 371 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (1959 the manuscript presented a "clear and present danger." Such apprehension over the circulation of a manuscript throughout the inmate population hardly justifies a complete prohibition against inmate writing. First, as in the case of incoming publications, few, if any, manuscripts will present a danger to security and discipline sufficient to justify seizure. Second, even if a manuscript were to pose too great a threat to security to be circulated throughout the prison, there is no state interest which justifies prohibiting manuscripts from being mailed to the outside for publication. Indeed, the publication of inmate literature could serve as a source for redressing prison grievances and at the same time help to reduce inmate tensions.
IN1TEATE AUNUSCRIPTS
No other state interest is served by limiting inmate writing; in fact, the state interest in rebabiitation may be served by such activity. Also, as in the case of censorship of incoming publications, the seizure of inmate manuscripts will do little to prevent inmates from communicating the ideas contained therein; official seizure may indeed be the best means of promoting these ideas. In total, the marginal increase in inmate tensions created by the possibility that a "dangerous" manuscript will be circulated does not seem comparable to the importance of the restricted right. This is especially true when the likelihood of official abuse, including the prohibition or seizure of manuscripts merely critical of prison conditions, is considered in the balance.
SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY
No prisoners' rights to non-religious speech or assembly have yet been recognized by courts reviewing inmate complaints. These two first amendment rights are, of course, closely linked, especially in prison. There, severe restricitions on freedom of movement often makes speech with even one other chosen person difficult. These restrictions are based on the belief that the chief concerns of prison administrators and the state interests most often recognized by courts-restraint and security of guards and prisoners--are closely related to restrictions on inmate movement. Courts are, therefore, very hesitant to order the greater inmate movement that would be necessary for even limited assembly and speech.
Courts have found, however, a right to speech and assembly when religious practice is involved 0 160 Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); [Vol. 63 FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS Similarly, many courts, including the Supreme Court, have declared constitutionally protected the right of one prisoner to receive legal help from another when professional counsel is not sufficiently available 6 While both of these rights may be reasonably limited as to time and location based on security considerations, neither can be denied.
Recent decisions concerning inmate correspondence have stated that the inmate's right to free speech is no less a "preferred constitutional right" than is freedom of religion or right to counsel. This has always been true outside of prison.
162 A prisoner's right to non-religious or non-legal speech should warrant no less judicial protection than its less secular counterparts. The state interest in restricting more general inmate speech is not any greater than it is for religious speech; surely the security considerations are the same. Courts have also begun to recognize that non-religious speech can be just as important to rehabilitation as is its religious counterpart. As one court recently stated:
[WVle doubt whether preparation of a prisoner for return to civilian life is advanced by deadening his initiative and concerns for events within the prison itself.
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Inmate communication within prison may serve as a model for relationships after release.
The least restrictive means doctrine would require accommodation of security interests with first amendment rights, as is done in the case of religious assembly, rather than permitting a total ban on inmate speech and assembly. It is a fundamental constitutional tenet that those similarly classified must be similarly treated, and that the system of classification itself must bear a rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. Under the equal protection clause, it would not seem possible to be able to classify detainees, awaiting trial, in the same group with those persons who have been convicted of crime and sentenced to prison. And yet, that appears to be what we have been doing as a practical matter, not only locally, but across the nation. Ironically, the lot of those detained while awaiting trial appears to be worse than that of those convicted and serving their sentences in the usual penitentiary systems.
17 '
Because they are presumed to be innocent, 
SENTENCE DICHOTOMY
Sentenced inmates should minimally be granted all of the first amendment rights recently granted to detainees. It is true that in addition to matters of prison administration itself, the only explicitly recognized state interest in imprisoning pre-trial defendants is to ensure their appearance in court, while sentenced inmates are imprisoned in order to rehabilitate them, deter them from further crime, and "punish" them in proportion to their crimes. However, as pointed our earlier, penologists generally agree that expansion rather than restriction of first amendment rights of prisoners best serves 178 These cases have not explained why excape plans are less of a problem with detainees. But see Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971) Supp. 776, 789-90 (D.R.I. 1970 ) (incoming mail from approved addressees may not be read; mail from others may be read, but can be censored only for "highly inflammatory writings and hard core pornography").
'' Ironically, pre-trial detainees have, in the past, often been subjected to institutional conditions far worse than those faced by sentenced inmates because many detention facilities were originally planned for smaller, shorter-term populations than they now contain. Sentenced institutions, because they are often better equipped for visits and other inmate movement, have provided sentenced inmates with greater opportunities to exercise first amendment rights than exist for detainees. Several recent decisions, however, suggest a future willingness of courts to order conditions in detention institutions improved if poor conditions interfere with the exercise of protected first amendment rights of pre-trial prisoners. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 , 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971 rehabilitation. Retribution and deterrence though perhaps served by directly restricting first amendment rights, are equally well served by other constitutionally less restrictive forms of punishment. 1 " Thus, only restraint and the purposes of prison administration, including the security of inmates and guards, remain as underlying considerations for withdrawing first amendment rights from sentenced inmates.
Both detainees and sentenced inmates must thus lose some first amendment rights, based solely on considerations of prison administration and security. As a practical matter however, the large majority of the sentenced population, and particularly that segment with short sentences, would seem to present fewer security problems than the detention population. Prison administrators generally have much more information on sentenced prisoners, including background data, psychological difficulties and potential dangerousness, enabling them to better predict security risks. Sentenced inmates are more certain of their term of stay and are interested for the most part in simply serving out their time. In many jurisdictions prisoners have the added incentive of possible early release based on "good behavior" during incarceration."3 Detainees, on the other hand, are generally uncertain about their future and face almost constant pressure and anxiety caused by numerous court appearances and plea bargaining sessions. Whereas sentenced institutions have a fairly stable population, detention institutions have a high turnover rate, with some men detained for many months and many others out within a week. This means a constant influx of new pre-trial prisoners about whom virtually nothing is known. Because detainees are placed in detention only hours after arrest, they may be undergoing drug or alcohol withdrawal, or may be in shock or in an otherwise extremely upset emotional state. Finally, at present, the sentenced institutions, as compared to detention prisons, usually provide inmates with facilities which are less crowded, with less population fluctuation, and with better medical and psychiatric care and better social services support. These factors can mean lower levels of inmate tension and frustration in sentenced institutions. From a security and restraint point of view, then, it would seem that sentenced institutions should properly be no more, 183 See note 105 supra.
" See, e.g 
1972]
and perhaps even less, restrictive than should prisons for pre-trial detainees. l7 Constitutional considerations have been held to require that detained inmates should be free of interference with outgoing mail, free of censorship of incoming mail and publications, and should have the right to expanded visiting privileges. Since there is no greater state security, or other, interest in denying these same rights to sentenced men and there is no less infringement of important constitutional freedoms if these rights are denied to them, sentenced inmates should also be granted these rights. There have as yet been no court rulings granting detainees the rights to speech and assembly within prison. As such rulings occur in the future-and decisions to date would suggest that such rights will be granted to detention inmates first-these rights should be extended to sentenced inmates.
SUMMARY
The balancing of interests and least restrictive means tests provide the proper standards for the future expansion of inmate first amendment rights within the context of actual institutional security needs. Courts have moved in the right 185 Groups of particularly "safe" sentenced men might be given even fuller first amendment freedom under a classification system. (To some extent this is now done by institutional assignment.) The main problem with such a system would be the likelihood of official abuse via assignment of inmates to lower classification for political or religious beliefs. Careful court scrutiny might still make such a system feasible, however. direction in granting greater first amendment rights to detainees; these greater constitutional protections should be extended to sentenced inmates as well. Courts have granted both sentenced inmates and detainees expanded rights to religious assembly and speech; other first amendment rights deserve equal protection. At the same time, courts must begin to more carefully scrutinize security claims of prison officials, and, in so doing, consider the people making daily decisions involving inmate rights and set out principles which are not easily subject to abuse.
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In considering inmate claims to greater first amendment rights, reviewing courts should consider carefully the words justice Frankfurter wrote in a similar context: Freedom of expression is the wellspring of our civilization-the civilization we seek to maintain and further.... The treatment of its minorities; especially their legal position, is among the most searching tests of the legal civilization attained by a society. It is better for those who have almost nnlimited power of government in their hands to err on the side of freedom.
187
State interests on many levels will be best served by greater not lesser first amendment rights for our incarcerated minority.
186 Courts also must apply the "least restrictive means" test to all official actions justified as necessary to security.
'1 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 548-50 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
